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The content of the book
The thesis of this book is that religions, such as Christianity, which
assume that there is a God who sometimes intervenes in the uni-
verse and who wants to give man a meaningful life and and afterlife,
is idolatrous, childish, and naive, and that instead panentheism is
true, ‘God in all, and all in God’ (119). In the preface, Johnston
writes that the book ‘contains some philosophy but is not a work of
philosophy’. That means that he often declines ‘the philosophically
interesting pathways that branch off from what’ he says, and that
he does not interact much with the philosophical literature.
*This is a preprint, forthcoming in Dialectica.
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The book starts with the question ‘Is your God really God?’
(1) That means: is your faith and trust directed ‘to the one who
is in fact the Highest One’ (9)? ‘The achievement of believing in
God can come about only in the wake of God’s self-revelation.’ (9)
‘What we need, in order to clarify the meaning of “God” thought
of as a descriptive name, is a conjunction of descriptions, call it
D, such that it no longer seems a substantial question whether D
is God.’ The reader might expect after reading this that Johnston
will develop a clear description of the nature of God or analyse
alleged revelations. But in fact Johnston develops a revisionary
conception of God based on metaphorical descriptions of God.
The reason Johnston gives for rejecting traditional monotheism
is that it is ‘idolatrous’. The basic form of idolatry is ‘worship of
lifeless idols’. (20) The idol worshipper assumes that ‘the god is
here, somehow contained where the idol is’, embodied in the idol.
Another aspect of idolatry is that the wrong gods are worshipped,
but Johnston dismisses this understanding of idolatry as ‘narrow
ethnocentrism’ because it means that it is always the others who
are idolaters. (28) He suggests that the mistake of idolatry is the
‘attempt to domesticate the experience of Divinity, to put it to
some advantage in a still unredeemed life. And then the true God
slips away.’ In the end, of course, Johnston’s view also amounts to
saying that it is the others who are idolaters, namely those who
believe that God intervenes in the course of events or gives a man
an afterlife. Johnston does not argue much for this claim. It is
based on the tacit assumption that there is no such God, because
on the assumption that there is such a God one would not call
belief in such a God ‘idolatrous’.
Although the subtitle of the book, ‘Religion after Idolatry’, may
be taken to suggest that the charge of idolatry is the key argument
against traditional monotheism, Johnston’s claim depends more on
his rejection of supernaturalism. Supernaturalism Johnston defines
as ‘belief in invisible spiritual agencies whose putative interventions
would violate the laws of nature, at least as those laws are presently
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understood.’ (40) He calls this a ‘mantic worldview’. (41) The claim
that interventions in the course of events, such as the resurrection
of Jesus, would be ‘violations of the laws of nature’ Johnston does
not defend. He simply assumes that science has shown that there
are no, or cannot be, interventions. This, like many aspects of
Johnston’s book, reminds the reader of German liberal theology.
For example, Rudolf Bultmann famously claimed in the same vain:
‘It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail
ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the
same time to believe in the New Testament world of daemons and
spirits.’ (Bultmann 1961, p. 5)
And like Bultmann, instead of rejecting Christianity, Johnston
reinterprets religion to fit naturalism, or replaces it by something
which he does not call ‘atheism’ although it entails that there is
no God as usually understood. Johnston assumes that every event
‘flows with a certain probability from previous events, as a matter
of natural law’. (48) ‘Our world is closed under purely natural caus-
ation.’ Johnston also assumes that there are no immaterial things,
such as souls. (184 and 127) So Johnston presupposes naturalism.
He also says, as German liberal theologians typically said, that
God ‘is not another efficient cause alongside the physical causes’
(118), although of course theism claims that God sustains all things
in being and is thus not just another efficient cause alongside the
physical causes.
Johnston defends his position with an argument for naturalism
from ‘true religion’. True religion entails that ‘we should hope that
ontological naturalism is true. For ontological naturalism would be
a complete defense against the supernatural powers and principal-
ities that could otherwise exploit our tendency to servile idolatry
and spiritual materialism.’ (51) He must mean by this that belief
in divine interventions is idolatrous and that belief in naturalism
is incompatible with this belief.
Another argument which Johnston gives against supernaturalism
is that it leads to violence. He suggests that there is ‘religiously
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required’ (160) violence. Christianity, he claims, ‘allegedly born
from the gospel of love, has fallen into the violence of crusades and
inquisitions, and the vengeful threats of apocalypse and hell’. ‘Sac-
rifice, atonement, apocalypse, crusade, jihad (in the baser sense),
all this followed by the exquisite tortures of hell’ are natural out-
comes of supernaturalist theism. By mentioning atonement and
hell here, he seems to suggest that saying that Christ atoned for
our sins or that some will be punished in hell is an act of violence,
as if the punishing were done not by God but by the preacher who
says that there is a hell. In another chapter Johnston offers an
explanation for religious violence: If someone believes that he has
been told by God how to live, then he will naturally also believe
that God legitimates and cooperates in his ‘violence against the
infidels’ (169). No further defense of these claims is given. Why
should a theist not believe that he has no right to kill infidels?
While it is possible that some religions teach us to kill infidels, this
does not seem to follow in any way from classical theism. To the
contrary, theistic belief induces a desire to live a good life because
God is believed to be good, and that excludes killing other men.
And Johnston’s reference to crusades and inquisitions is not backed
up by any historical evidence nor by any discussion of the ques-
tion whether possible wrong actions in the name of Christianity
were really carried out by Christians and whether they were done
despite rather than because of the Christan faith.
A central claim of classical theism, which Johnston rejects, is
that God is the first cause of the universe and that hence the uni-
verse is distinct from God. Johnston argues against the existence
of such a ‘separate creation’. (95)
Suppose that there is something created by the Highest
One, but nonetheless distinct from the Highest One, in
that it is not some part, aspect, principle, or mode of
the Highest One. Call this other thing ‘the separate
creation’. If there is such a separate creation, then we
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would expect the perfections of the Highest One to be
to some extent reflected in that separate creation. Con-
sider, then, the joint reality made up of the Highest One
and the separate creation. It would seem that this joint
reality might be a more appropriate object of worship
than the subpart of the reality that is the Highest One.
[. . . ] But only the Highest One deserves worship. So
there is no separate creation. What is called creation is
some part or aspect or principle of mode of the Highest
One. That is why a worshipful attitude to the whole of
reality is not idolatrous. (95)
So if God creates something, then that thing deserves to be wor-
shipped too. Johnston’s ‘worshipful attitude’ towards creation re-
minds the reader of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1799, p. 38) ‘con-
templating and feeling the universe’. As everything that deserves
worship must be a part of God, there cannot be a separate creation.
The objectionable premise in this argument is of course that what
is created by God deserves to be worshipped. God can perhaps
create a being that deserves worship (as Christianity claims that
the Father brought into being the Son and the Spirit, who also
deserve worship), but why should everything that God creates de-
serve worship? God could create a rabbit, a golden mountain, or a
sun, which would not deserve worship because, although they are
made by God, they are not God. But Johnston is content with the
argument as it stands.
This leads Johnston to panentheism, the view with the motto
‘God in all, and all in God’. (119) He wants to distinguish this
from pantheism, defined as the view that God and ‘the natural
realm’ are identical.
Against such pantheistic identification of God and the
natural realm, the panentheist will assert that God is
partly constituted by the natural realm, in the sense
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that his activity is manifest in and through natural
processes alone. But this reality goes beyond what is
captured by the purely scientific description of all the
events that make up the natural realm. (119)
How is God more than the natural realm, ‘a causal realm closed
under natural law’ (120)? The answer must lie in the following
identification:
The Highest one = the outpouring of Existence Itself by
way of its exemplification in ordinary existents for the
purpose of the self-disclosure of Existence itself. (120)
As everything exemplifies Existence or God, understanding some-
thing amounts to understanding the Divine Mind:
At the idealized limit of this process of deepening un-
derstanding, we would come to grasp those modes of
presentation of reality that are fully adequate and com-
plete, and so reveal the nature of what they present. In
this sense, we would be conforming our minds to the
Divine Mind, which may be construed as the totality
of fully adequate and complete modes of presentation
of reality. (155)
So the Mind of God is ‘the totality of fully adequate modes of
presentation’. Somehow, God is more than the natural realm as
captured by the purely scientific description because that descrip-
tion fails to capture the presentational aspect. However, presenta-
tion is not another realm:
Reality is Being-making-itself-present-to-beings, not a
sort of conjunction or fusion of two realms, the realm
of sense and the realm of nature. [. . . ] The beings,
that is, each and every creaturely thing that exists, are
themselves exemplifications of Being. (156)
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In order to justify saying that there is a God while at the same
time ruling out interventions and denying that there is a separate
creation, Johnston says that speaking about God is ‘analogical’,
i. e. non-literal.
The Love of the Highest one was analogized as its out-
pouring in ordinary existents, its Will as self-disclosure,
its Mind as the most revealing presentations found in
the realm of sense, and its Power as the totality of the
laws of nature. In these respects, the Highest One has
by analogy the characteristics of a person, but a person
far removed from ordinary personality. [. . . ] These ana-
logical ways of speaking are] chosen here because they
explicitly discourage the idolatrous hope for a Cosmic
Intervener who might confer special worldly advantage
on his favorites. (158f)
The last chapter of the book, ‘Christianity without Spiritual
Materialism’, seeks to offer a reinterpretation of, or alternative to,
Christianity. Throughout the book there are several criticisms of
Christianity: supernaturalism is childish and naive and incompat-
ible with the results of science; Christianity requires violence, such
as the ‘crusades and inquisitions’ (160); the Christian doctrine of
penal substitution is ‘morally incoherent’ (161); the belief in Jesus’
resurrection is ‘mystical theology’ (43); belief in ‘the afterlife, the
other worlds, and so forth’ is an ‘idolatrous substitute for genuine
faith in the importance of goodness’ (124); and Judaism is ‘a higher
religion’ because it is relatively indifferent ‘to the very idea of an af-
terlife’ (176). But nevertheless Johnston does not want to say just
that Christianity is wrong but wants to reinterpret it. While ori-
ginal Christianity teaches that salvation consists in the forgiveness
of sin (Col. 1:14) and leads to a desirable life after death, Johnston
says that salvation ‘is the grace of finding a way to live that keeps
faith with the importance of goodness and love even in the face of
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everything that can happen to you’ (180). Our original sin ‘consists
in self-will combined with the aspiration to possess the knowledge
of how to live’ (168). Eve’s mistake was her hope that knowledge
about how to live could be possessed by human beings. Although
Christ did not really rise from the dead, Christ was resurrected in
the sense that ‘those who are truly good’ win a ‘collective victory
over death’ (186).
Evaluation
Let me indicate three areas where Johnston’s book invites objec-
tions. First, Johnston’s rejection of supernaturalism is defended
only by affirmation, not by argument. Johnston wants to reject
supernaturalism not by discussing the usual arguments for the ex-
istence of God but by taking the shortcut of claiming that inter-
ventions are impossible or incompatible with science. He just relies
on calling an intervention a ‘violation of the laws of nature’ and
then assumes that science has shown that there are and cannot be
interventions. This approach has been thoroughly criticised again
and again ever since David Hume made it popular, for example
by George Campbell (1762) and recently by Robert Larmer (1988)
and by John Earman’s book with the telling title Hume’s Abject
Failure: The Argument against Miracles (2000).
It is certainly not obvious that miracles are ruled out by the
laws of nature or by science. Suppose that God moved a stone
from position A to position B. Even if we assume that the determ-
inistic Newtonian laws of motion are the ultimate ones, this does
not contradict these laws. They say what forces there are acting
on the stone. In particular, the law of gravity says that there is
a certain force between the stone and the ground. Is that law vi-
olated if God moves the stone from A to B? It would be violated
if God thereby abolished the force, but there is no reason to as-
sume this. Which law then would be violated? Johnston should
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tell us. He has given no reason for rejecting supernaturalism and
hence no reason for preferring panentheism to theism. So John-
ston calls supernaturalism childish and naive, although he gives no
arguments against it and does not discuss even a single text from
the enormous contemporary literature defending the coherence of
theism.
Secondly, Johnston needs for his defense of panentheism the
thesis that speaking about God is analogical. Without this, he
should simply say ‘There is no God’. Discussing the doctrine of
analogy he mentions Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’ reason for saying
that predications about God are analogical is this: To say of a man
that he is just is to say that being just is amongst his properties.
By contrast, being just is not amongst the properties of God but,
according to Aquinas’ doctrine of simplicity, God is identical with
his being just, as well as with his being omnipotent, etc. There-
fore Aquinas says that speaking about God is very different from
speaking about a man. Johnston has no reason like this for say-
ing that speaking about God is analogical. He only says that this
thesis ‘discourages the hope for a Cosmic Intervener’. (158) But
not every view can be expressed analogically or metaphorically
with the words ‘There is a God’. It is wrong simply to take one’s
view about ultimate things and say that it is the analogical mean-
ing of ‘There is a God’. Whether a sentence has an analogical or
metaphorical meaning and what this might be is not something the
speaker can decide, but it is determined by the context. Johnston
does not show that ‘God’ actually has the meaning which he wishes
it to have. And who means by ‘God’ something remotely similar
to what Johnston means by it? Nobody except a few theologians.
It is therefore wrong to express Johnson’s view by saying ‘There is
a God’. Doing so is at best poetical and at worst just confusing.
Thirdly, Johnston’s panentheism seems to be incoherent or mean-
ingless. Johnston calls God ‘almighty’ (49), but also excludes the
possibility that God can intervene in the course of events. That
seems incoherent because being almighty entails being able to in-
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tervene. Further, Johnston writes that God reveals himself, but
also says that God does not do anything for us (20). Further,
Johnston’s description of God as ‘the outpouring of Being by way
of its exemplification in ordinary existents for the sake of the self-
disclosure of Being’ (158) and of God’s mind as ‘the totality of
fully adequate modes of presentation’ (156) seems to be incompat-
ible with his claim that God is a person who has love, will, mind,
and power (158). Further, Johnston’s thesis that ‘God is partly
constituted by the natural realm’ (117) is incompatible with his
thesis that there is no separate creation, because the latter, as
Johnston seems to understand it, implies that neither God nor a
part of God is distinct from nature. Johnston’s reply is that all
speaking about God is analogical. But has he succeed in giving
meaning to sentences about God which is clear and coherent? Is
there a possible belief that one could express by saying that there
is ‘the outpouring of Being by way of its exemplification in ordin-
ary existents for the sake of the self-disclosure of Being’ (158)? If
not, then Johnston’s description of what he wants to call ‘God’ or
‘the Highest One’ is meaningless. The belief which comes closest
to what Johnston is getting at can be expressed clearly by saying
‘There is no God’, but Johnston does not want to say that.
I cannot say that this is a book that deserves our attention. It
is a rant against supernaturalism and Christianity, puts forward a
meaningless view, and gives no reasons for preferring this view to
either theism or atheism.
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